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Abstract—Dynamic wireless charging is an emerging technol-
ogy that allows electric vehicles (EVs) to be charged while on
the move. Accurate billing for dynamic EV charging requires
secure communication between the EVs and the power utility, and
could potentially require the secure delivery of small messages
from the EVs to the utility at a very high rate, which is an
infeasible task with the currently available solutions. In this
paper we propose Fast Authentication for Dynamic EV Charging
(FADEC) designed to meet the communication needs of dynamic
EV charging. FADEC features fast signing and verification, incurs
low communication overhead, and fast hand-off authentication to
support EV mobility. Our simulations show that compared with
ECDSA mandated by the 802.11p standard, FADEC reduces data
delivery delay by up to 97%, increases the data delivery ratio
by more than an order of magnitude and enables timely data
delivery even in a resource constrained environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic wireless charging [1], [2] is a promising tech-
nology for charging electric vehicles (EV) while driving. The
basic idea is to place charging coils under the charging pads
on the road and attach charging coils to the EV’s battery.
When the EV is driving above the coil, the electromagnetic
interaction between the coils under the road and the coils in
the EV can charge the EV battery. The charge rate depends on
many factors, such as the distance between the coils, vehicle
speed, and ultimately on the decision of the vehicle’s driver
whether to charge.
Since the charge rate is not constant, dynamic charging can
only become a commercial service if charged EVs can be billed
accurately. Accurate billing requires that the EVs that should
be charged can be identified, and that the EVs report their
battery levels periodically to the utility company providing
the electricity. Fine grained billing under dynamic pricing
and changing traffic conditions could potentially require the
reporting to be very frequent.
Identification for the purpose of enforcement can be solved
using smart cameras, as it is often done on toll roads, but
reporting requires that there be communication between the
EV and the utility company. Since the communication between
the EVs and the utility would serve for billing purposes, it is
crucial that the utility can authenticate the EVs’ reports. Since
reporting could potentially be very frequent, the signing and
the verification of the EV reports should be fast.
A natural candidate for EV to utility communication is the
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), which is a
medium range wireless technology developed for automotive
use based on the IEEE 802.11p standard. DSRC is already
used for electronic toll collection in many countries. In DSRC
roadside units (RSU) are deployed along the road, and are
connected to a private or public backbone network, which
allows them to communicate with the utility company, e.g.,
through the Internet. Each EV is equipped with an on-board
unit, which it uses to communicate with the RSUs, typically
within a range of around 500 meters. Clearly, EVs would
have to authenticate with the RSUs to ensure they send
their reports to the right RSU. At the same time, the RSUs
would have to authenticate messages received from the EVs
to be able to implement access control. Signing messages
and verifying signatures must be fast, since the RSUs would
have to handle the authentication of reports from many EVs.
The authentication mechanism also needs to support mobility,
because an EV could communicate with the utility company
through different RSUs as it moves along a road.
The IEEE 802.11p standard suggests the use of Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for authenti-
cation in vehicular networks. Recent work [3] has shown,
however, that using ECDSA it could take a significant amount
of time to sign a message and to verify a signature, which
makes it susceptible to DoS attacks. To overcome the disad-
vantage of computation overhead of ECDSA, researchers have
proposed the use of one-time signature for authentication [3]–
[6]. However, one-time signature is not the ideal solution in
our scenario since it could incur non-trivial key generation and
signing overhead [4], requires delayed verification [5], or put
restrictions on the content to be authenticated [3].
In this paper we propose Fast Authentication for Dynamic
EV Charging (FADEC) designed to support the communication
needs of dynamic wireless EV charging. FADEC features
fast message signing, fast signature verification, fast hand-
off authentication, and low communication overhead. FADEC
allows the EV to use the same key to authenticate with a series
of RSUs, so that the EV does not have to re-authenticate itself
every time it encounters a new RSU. Our simulations show
that FADEC is suitable for dynamic EV charging scenarios.
Compared with ECDSA, FADEC reduces the data delivery
delay by at most 97% and improves the delivery ratio by more
than an order of magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce security background and reveiw related work, and
in Section III we describe our system model and assumptions.
In Section IV we describe the proposed authentication solution.
We present simulation results in Section V, and conclude our
paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Security Background
1) HMAC: Hash-based Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) is a fast authentication mechanism based on sym-
metric keys. The sender and receiver both have the same
symmetric key k, and when the sender wants to send a message
M , he computes a hash value HMAC(k,M) using the shared
key k on the message M . Both M and HMAC(k,M) are sent
to the receiver. Upon receiving message M ′ and its signature
HMAC(k,M), the receiver can verify that M ′ = M , and
the message comes from the authentic sender, by recomput-
ing HMAC(k,M ′) and verifying that HMAC(k,M ′) =
HMAC(k,M). The advantage of HMAC authentication is
its fast signing and verification speed.
2) ECDSA: In Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), each
communication party has a public key P and a private key
S. The public key is made known to everyone else while the
private key should be known only to the owner. The sender
signs the message M using his private key S to produce a
signature S(M), and sends it with message M . The receiver,
when receiving M ′, S(M), could check the authenticity of the
message by computing P (S(M)) using the public key P of
the claimed sender and can verify that M ′ = P (S(M)).
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is
an improved version of DSA. The IEEE 802.11p standard
suggests the use of ECDSA to authenticate vehicle safety
messages. However, previous work [3] has shown that ECDSA
takes non-trivial time to sign and to verify a signature, and is
not suitable when there are lots of signatures to verify, which is
common in scenarios where many EVs send frequent reports.
Another major drawback of ECDSA is its vulnerability to DoS
attacks, where the attacker could flood the network with many
fake signatures, and the recipient RSU will be busy verifying
those fake signatures.
3) Just Fast Keying (JFK): Just Fast Keying (JFK) [7] is a
Diffie-Hellman based key exchange protocol. The goal of JFK
is to allow two communicating parties to establish a shared
secret key even when the communication media is insecure,
i.e., the attacker could eavesdrop on the communication chan-
nel. The major advantage of JFK is that it is DoS-resistant
and protects the RSU from signature flooding attack where
the attacker sends lots of signatures for the RSU to verify so
that it does not have time to verify signatures from honest
vehicles.
B. Related Work
TESLA [5] is a broadcast authentication protocol that
features fast message signing and signature verification. It uses
one-way hash function to form a chain of symmetric keys and
sign each message using one key from the key chain. The
message with its signature is sent first, but the key used to
sign the message is revealed later to the receiver. This delayed
verification is the major drawback of TESLA, and makes it
infeasible for our real-time statistics reporting scenario.
HORS [4] is a representative one-time signature scheme
with fast signing and verifying. However, the major drawback
of HORS is that, every time the sender wants to sign a
message, it needs to generate lots of public/private key pairs,
and distribute the public keys to the receivers. In our dynamic
wireless charging scenario, the EV is generating messages with
real-time statistics and responsible for signing these messages,
and the large key generation overhead makes it impractical
to apply HORS in our scenario. Time Valid HORS (TV-
HORS) [6] combines one-way hash chains and HORS to
reduce the frequency of public key distribution, and is robust
against packet loss. The major drawback of TV-HORS is its
public key size, which can be as large as 10KB.
FastAuth [3] is proposed to authenticate vehicle safety
messages that include the location and the velocity of the
vehicle, and generates short signatures by predicting the future
locations of the vehicle. However, in our scenario the mes-
sage content to be authenticated, i.e., the real-time statistics
generated by the EV, might not be predictable, which makes
FastAuth inapplicable.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The system we consider consists of a wireless charging pad
beneath a stretch of a road, a set of RSUs along the stretch
of road, a utility company that provides power to the pad, and
the EVs.
We assume that each EV is equipped with a DSRC on-
board unit and can communicate wirelessly with the RSUs.
The RSUs and the utility company are connected through a
backbone network. In order to communicate with the utility
company, the EV will send its messages wirelessly to an RSU,
which will then relay the EV’s messages to the utility company.
If the utility company wants to send a message back to the EV,
it will send the message to the RSU through the backbone
network. The RSU will then send the message wirelessly to
the EV.
We assume a full deployment of PKI, i.e., the EVs, the
RSUs, and the utility company all have their own public/private
keys for digital signature. We also assume a public/private key
pair that is shared by all RSUs, which allows an EV to verify
that it is indeed communicating with an RSU, although it does
not know which RSU it is. We assume a Certificate Authority
(CA) that certifies all public keys. In particular, an EV only
needs to store the public key of the CA, and can learn the
authenticity of other public keys by verifying the correspond-
ing certificates. We assume that a secure connection has been
established between neighboring RSUs and between the utility
company and each RSU. FADEC thus focuses mainly on the
authentication between the EVs and the RSUs, and between
the EVs and the utility company. We assume that all EVs
and all RSUs have similar limited computational resources
to sign messages and to verify signatures, while the utility
company has significantly more computational resources. We
assume that the attacker has similar computational resource
as an ordinary EV or RSU. We assume the attacker could
compromise an arbitrary number of EVs and obtain all their
secrets including the private keys and the established session
keys, but cannot compromise the CA, the utility company, or
any RSU.
An EV could potentially turn off its on-board unit in an
attempt to charge the battery without being billed. One way
to prevent this is to place smart cameras at the beginning of
the charging section and take pictures of the EVs. An EV that
refuses to communicate to the RSUs can be identified and can
be levied a fine. This provides an incentive for an EV to initiate
communication with the RSUs and with the utility company.
The ultimate goal for FADEC is to allow the utility
company to verify the integrity of messages sent by an EV and
the identity of its sender for correct billing. This is not enough,
however. Without further authentication, an attacker could
impersonate an RSU or the utility company to attract messages
containing sensitive information from EVs. The attacker could
also be a malicious EV trying to hide its identity or pretending
to be another EV in order to evade billing.
Thus, the considered charging scenario also requires that
the EV can authenticate the identity of the utility company
before sending real-time reports, to ensure the reports are
delivered to the proper utility. Since all messages between the
EV and the utility company are relayed by RSUs, the EVs and
the RSUs must also authenticate each other. The authentication
between the EVs and the RSUs is an important security
primitive for network operations such as access control, load
balancing, and accounting. Without such authentication, an
attacker may flood the network with junk data and evade
punishment by claiming the identity of some other EV. Au-
thentication also ensures that the RSU will relay messages
from the utility office to the correct EV.
Based on the above considerations we formulate the fol-
lowing design goals for FADEC.
a) Fast message signing: The EVs might need to send
charging-related information to the utility company at a high
rate. Therefore they should be able to sign messages quickly.
b) Fast signature verification: Since the RSU and the
utility company may handle messages from many EVs and
must verify many signatures, verification has to be fast. Fast
signature verification is also important to defend against DoS
attacks. If the verification takes long, an attacker could launch
a DoS attack by flooding the network with fake signatures,
and the recipient RSU or the utility company would spend
most or all of its computational resources on verifying the
fake signatures.
c) Fast hand-off authentication: As the EV moves, the
RSU associated with the EV can change. When the EV is
moving out of the range of the current RSU, it must be able
to quickly re-authenticate itself with the next RSU so it can
resume sending reports.
d) Low communication overhead: The signature length
must be short. This requirement is motivated by that an EV
will most likely generate many messages of small sizes, e.g.,
messages containing only its battery state of charge. Attaching
a long signature to a short message means more energy is used
to transmit the signature instead of the message content.
IV. FADEC
In the following we describe the proposed FADEC au-
thentication scheme. We illustrate FADEC in Fig. 1. EV e
establishes a symmetric session key Kre with the RSUs and
another symmetric session key Kue with the utility company.
The session keys are established using JFK. Before sending a
Fig. 1. Overview of FADEC.
message m 1 to the utility company, the EV first computes
the signature σue = HMAC(Kue ,m) on m using HMAC
with key Kue , and the signature σre = HMAC(Kre ,m′) on
m′ = (m,σue ), and sends (m′, σre) to the RSU. The RSU
verifies the signature σre , and then relays the message content
m′ = (m,σue ) to the utility company through the previously
established secure channel. The utility company verifies the
signature σue and then accepts the message m. In the following
section we describe how the EV establishes the two session
keys Kre and Kue .
A. Establishing Session Key Kre with the RSUs
The EV establishes a session key with RSU using JFK [7].
The challenge here is that, as the EV moves along the road,
it constantly leaves the communication range of the current
RSU and enters the range of a new RSU. One naive approach
is to require the EV to establish a new session key with every
RSU it encounters. However, as JFK involves digital signature
computation and takes multiple rounds of message exchanges,
re-establishing a new session key at every RSU would incur
non-trivial computational cost to both the EV and the RSU.
FADEC follows the approach of key dissemination. The
EV establishes a session key Kre with its first encountered
RSU using the JFK protocol, and will authenticate with all
subsequent RSUs using the same key Kre . The challenge is
to ensure that by the time the EV enters the communica-
tion range of a new RSU, that RSU has already obtained
the corresponding session key Kre from the RSU previously
associated with the EV. Flooding the key is infeasible as it
incurs too much communication overhead. An alternative is
for the current RSU to predict the movement of the EV and
send the key to the RSU that the EV will most likely encounter.
This approach, however, unnecessarily complicates the design
of the authentication framework, and the EV mobility could
be difficult to predict given complex road topology.
We solve the key dissemination problem using a broadcast-
and-discard approach, as illustrated in Fig. 2. When RSU A
first establishes key Kre with EV e, it broadcasts the key
to all its neighbor RSUs (in terms of proximity along the
road) through the backbone network. When a neighbor RSU B
receives Kre , it stores the key for tA→B seconds, where tA→B
is a fixed parameter that estimates the maximum time required
for an EV currently in range of RSU A to move into the range
1Note that FADEC does not aim to provide message confidentiality, and here
m could be either encrypted or in plain text. Designing a proper encryption
algorithm for dynamic EV charging is out of the scope of this paper, although
one could potentially use FADEC to establish another session key between
the EV and the utility company and use AES encryption.
Step 1: EV e establishes key Kre Step 2: A disseminates Kre to Step 3: When EV e enters the range
with the current RSU A. both neighbor RSUs B and C. of C, C keeps the key Kre , while both
A and B discard the key.
Fig. 2. Illustration of key establishment, dissemination to neighbors and discarding of unused keys.
of B.2 If EV e does not try to communicate with RSU B using
Kre within tA→B time then RSU B discards the key. Similarly,
when C receives Kre , it stores the key for tA→C seconds. In
Fig. 2, EV e is moving towards C, and enters the range of
C within tA→C seconds. If EV e communicates with RSU
C using Kre , then C will store Kre for additional tC seconds,
where tC is a fixed parameter estimating the duration when EV
e stays within the range of C. 3 Intuitively, the number of keys
stored by an RSU is very small, since an EV generally stays
within its range for tens of seconds. Our simulations confirm
this; in a heavily loaded highway scenario each RSU needs to
hold about 30 keys on average.
Note that an RSU will disseminate the key Kre to its
neighbor RSUs only when the corresponding EV starts com-
municating with it. In Fig. 2, if the EV moves into the range
of RSU C but does not send any message, then C will also
discard the key and will not disseminate the key any further.
When the EV moves to the next RSU beyond C, that RSU
might not have the key Kre . However, in our scenario where
EVs send real-time reports periodically, it is unlikely that an
EV will not send any message to the RSU while it stays within
its range. Furthermore, even if the current RSU does not have
the key, it can establish a new session key with the EV.
Since packet loss is common in vehicular networks [8], the
EV may not be able to finish a key establishment process with
the RSU or with the utility company in one attempt. Therefore,
we employ an exponential backoff strategy. In our simulations
we found that exponential backoff with an initial timeout of 1
second and backoff multiplier of 2 achieved good performance.
B. Establishing Session Key Kue with Utility Company
An EV starts establishing Kue only when it has established
Kre with the RSU. Kue is also established using JFK. Since the
EV cannot directly communicate with the utility company, it
2tA→B can be effectively estimated given the locations of A,B and the
road map. For example, let lA and lB be the locations within the range of
RSU A and B respectively, such that the length d of the road connecting
lA and lB is maximized. If the road has a lower speed limit of v m/s, a
reasonable estimation could be tA→B = d/v.
3tC can be effectively estimated given the communication range of C and
the road map. In the case of a single straight road, a reasonable estimation is
tC = 2R/v, where R is the communication range and v is the lower speed
limit.
has to send its messages to an RSU, and the RSU will relay the
messages to the utility company. Once the EV has established
Kre with the RSUs, it will sign its messages using Kre before
sending them to the RSU, and the RSU will verify the signature
before relaying the EV’s messages. When the utility company
replies, the RSU will also sign the reply using Kre , and then
send it to the EV.
C. Prioritizing Key Establishment Messages
When an EV is sending or receiving JFK messages to
establish keys, other EVs that have completed their key
establishment might be sending application messages (e.g.,
p2p file sharing) at the same time. The existence of such
background data can have a non-negligible impact on the key
establishment duration, as the RSU queue is likely to have
many more application messages than JFK messages. Without
careful design, the RSU could delay the processing of JFK
messages indefinitely.
We solve this problem by having each RSU maintain two
queues: a JFK queue that stores only messages related to the
JFK protocol, and a normal data queue. An RSU prioritizes
the processing of JFK messages, and will start processing
messages from the data queue only when the JFK queue is
empty. In this way, a key establishment message will never
be delayed because some application messages have arrived
before it. In our implementation, the JFK queue employs the
First-In First-Out (FIFO) scheduling policy while the data
queue employs the Earliest Deadline First (EDF) policy.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We simulate road traffic on a 4-lane single-direction
straight road segment of 3km. There are a total of 5 RSUs
deployed evenly along the road segment, at distances 0.3, 0.9,
1.5, 2.1, and 2.7 km from the start of the road segment. We
use SUMO [9] to generate mobility traces from a congested
traffic flow with 7284 EV/hour where the vehicles travel at
a maximum speed of 75 km/h (46.9 mph), which has been
observed on I-10 westbound [10]. We use the mobility trace of
300 EVs as they traverse the 3kms long road segment; every
EV starts from a randomly chosen lane, and the simulation
stops when all EVs have left the road segment. In order to
evaluate the system in steady state, we show results for EVs
100 to 199, i.e., we discard the results of the first and the last
100 EVs.
We simulate a backbone connection between the utility
company and each RSU, and between each pair of neighbor
RSUs. The propagation delay between the utility company
and each RSU is set to 100 ms, and the delay between
neighbor RSUs is set to 1 ms. We use the Veins [11] simulator
to simulate IEEE 802.11p MAC layer behavior. We use the
default 802.11p settings from the Veins simulator for both the
RSU and the vehicles; the RSU can communicate with vehicles
within approximately 500 meters.
We evaluate FADEC in two scenarios with different as-
sumptions on the computational resource available to the EV
and the RSU. In the resource rich scenario, we assume the
EV and the RSU have a strong CPU to sign messages and to
verify signatures; in this scenario the signing and verification
using digital signature both take 20 ms. In the resource
constrained scenario, the EV and the RSU hardware have
less computational power; in this scenario digitally signing a
message and verifying a digital signature both take 200 ms.
In all our simulations the EVs generate 1024 bits of in-
formation per second. Unless otherwise noted, each EV sends
a report to the utility company every 5 seconds containing
all information since the generation of the last report. The
deadline for each report is set to be 5 seconds after its creation
time, since after 5 seconds the EV will generate a new report.
A. Key Establishment
We first consider the time it takes for an EV to establish
its keys. Recall that an EV e first establishes Kre with the
RSU, and then establishes Kue with the utility company. The
successful establishment of Kue thus implies the establishment
of Kre . In Fig. 3 we show the distribution of the time taken
to establish Kue when the RSUs prioritize key establishment
message processing as decribed in Section IV-C. The figure
shows that over 80% EVs establish Kue within 1.7 seconds
even in the resource constrained scenario. In the worst case the
key establishment takes 8.3 seconds. Note that an EV performs
key establishment only once, and uses the same Kre (Kue ) with
every RSU (the utility company). The one-time cost of 8.3
second is small compared to the time scale in a dynamic EV
charging scenario. 4
A natural question is whether it is neccesary to prioritize
key establishment message processing. As alternatives, we
consider two solutions: (i) the RSU maintains a single data
queue for both EV reports and key establishment messages
and employs FIFO scheduling policy; (ii) the RSU maintains
a single data queue but applies the EDF scheduling policy. The
deadline for a key establishment message is set to 1 second.
In Fig. 4 we show the distribution of the time it takes for
an EV to establish keys with both the RSU and the utility in
the resource constrained scenario. We use results from the first
100 EVs to illustrate how the system reaches its stable state.
The results show that maintaining only one queue for both key
4In our simulation, it takes around 144 seconds for an EV to travel through
the 3 km road segment, during which time it spends, only once, a maximum
of 8.3 seconds to establish session keys. Even at high speed of 105 km/h (65
mph), an EV still needs about 103 seconds to travel through the road segment.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  2  4  6  8  10
resource rich
resource constrained
Key establishment duration (s)
CD
F
Fig. 3. Distribution of establishment duration for EV-utility key Kue across
all EVs.
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Fig. 4. Establishment duration for EV-utility key Kue of the first 100 EVs
in the resource constrained scenario with different RSU queue management
strategies.
establishment messages and data messages does not guarantee
the success of key establishment for all EVs. Using a single
FIFO queue, only 8% EVs finish their key establishment, and
although using EDF scheduling helps, still less than 30% of
the EVs can complete their key establishments. Prioritizing key
establishment messages by maintaining a separate JFK queue
greatly reduces the key establishment duration, and allows all
EVs to complete the key establishment with both the RSU and
the utility company within 8.3 seconds. These results show
that prioritization is essential for succesful key establishment
in FADEC when computational resources are scarce.
B. Data Delivery Performance
1) Reporting Period: One point of uncertainty in terms of
the communication needs for dynamic wireless charging is the
reporting period. At one extreme, the EV could accumulate
information and could send one large report containing all
information when leaving the charging pad; at the other
extreme, the EV could send reports very frequently, with each
report containing only a small amount of information. We
therefore start with investigating how often an EV could send
reports to the utility company with and without FADEC. We
consider that the EVs send periodic reports every t seconds,
where t ranges from 5 to 9, and a report is considered as
delivered successfully if it arrives at the utility company within
t seconds. Each report contains all information generated by
the EV since the last report sent. A large reporting period t
means the EVs send reports less often, but each report is larger
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Fig. 5. Data delivery performance of FADEC, report delivery ratio and delay under various scenarios.
as it contains more information.
In Fig. 5 (a) we show the delivery ratio as a function
of the reporting period in the resource constrained scenario.
We omit the results obtained in the resource rich scenario
where both FADEC and ECDSA achieve delivery ratio close
to 1. The curves show the delivery ratio of reports averaged
across all EVs, and the error bars indicate the 5th and the 95th
percentiles. We can observe that FADEC is almost insensitive
to the reporting period and achieves a delivery ratio close to 1.
ECDSA, on the other hand, achieves a very low delivery ratio
when reports are sent frequently, even though EDF scheduling
is used in the RSU. The reason is that the RSU cannot perform
the verification needed by ECDSA at the rate at which reports
arrive. As a result, the RSU data queue keeps increasing, and
earlier reports miss the deadline. The delivery ratio of FADEC
is not only higher, but it is also more stable across all EVs; the
5th and the 95th percentiles are close to the average, whereas
the percentile intervals for ECDSA are rather wide. For the
rest evaluations we use ECDSA with EDF for comparison.
2) Reliability and Throughput: Achieving consistently high
data throughput is important for dynamic EV charging, since
it allows the utility company to obtain up-to-date information
about the EV status. In our scenario where all EVs send their
reports at the same frequency, throughput is porportional to
the delivery ratio.
In Fig. 5 (b) we show the distribution of the delivery ratio
of reports from each EV for the two scenarios. Using FADEC,
most EVs are able to achieve a delivery ratio close to 1 in
both scenarios. Using ECDSA results in lower delivery ratios,
especially in the resource constrained scenario, where only
57% reports are delivered successfully on average. The reason
is that ECDSA’s large signing and verification overhead makes
the RSU data queue grow quickly, and most reports will miss
their deadlines even using EDF scheduling.
3) Delay: Finally, we consider the data delivery delay
observed by the utility company. The delay includes the time
taken by the EV to sign the report, the delay due to 802.11p
channel access and data transmission, the time taken by the
RSU to verify the signature, backbone network delay, and the
time taken by the utility company to verify the signature. This
is an important metric for our evaluation, since a shorter delay
means the utility company could receive reports from the EV
sooner and would thus have better knowledge of the current
charging profile of the EVs, and the instantaneous demand.
In Fig. 5 (c) we plot the distribution of the delay of all
reports that successfully arrived at the utility company within
their deadlines. FADEC achieves almost the same delay with
an average of 0.117 second in both scenarios. By design,
FADEC is insensitive to the increased cost of digital signature
operations in the resource constrained scenario, since once the
session keys are established, signing a message or verifying a
signature takes only one or two hash operations according to
HMAC. On the other hand, the average delay of ECDSA in the
resource rich scenario is 0.180 second, and increases to 4.805
seconds in the resource constrained scenario. In the resource
constrained scenario, the time to sign a message and to verify
a signature using ECDSA significantly increases. This greatly
affects the delay of ECDSA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented FADEC, authentication for
dynamic electric vehicle charging. FADEC lets EVs establish
symmetric keys with the RSUs and the utility company, and
achieves fast signing, fast verification, fast hand-off authentica-
tion, and low communication overhead. Our simulations have
shown that FADEC obtains very close to 1 report delivery
ratio and small delay in both resource rich and constrained
scenarios, and is more suitable for dynamic electric vehicle
charging than ECDSA.
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